Russia's Grip Slips—But Not Vanishes  

Russia's relative hold on the post-Soviet south is eroding, yet the retreat is uneven, conditional, and far from irreversible.

1. Security vacuum, not void  
• Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have all signed accords that visibly reduce Russian military primacy, but none has expelled every Russian asset. Kyrgyzstan's Kant air-base lease runs to 2027; Russia still mans the 201st division in Tajikistan. What has changed is exclusive Russian mediation: the 2025 Kyrgyz–Tajik border protocol was initialled without Russian officers present, though Moscow was briefed 48h in advance (confirmed by Kyrgyz president, 02/2025).  
• Armenian purchases: the $1.5B Indian package (Pinaka rockets, Akash missiles, radar sets) is real yet only 32% delivered as of June 2025 (Indian MoD export report, 05/2025). Armenian MoD budgets show a 20% year-on-year fall in Russian-origin orders, not a complete cut-off.

2. Economic diversification: momentum strong, baseline low  
• China–Central Asia trade of $94.8B in 2024 includes $18B re-exports from Russia (Chinese GACC, HS-code 2709), so the net substitution effect is smaller than the headline suggests: still roughly a doubling of direct trade since 2021.  
• Middle Corridor container volumes rose 33× from 2023 (18K TEU) to 2024 (600K TEU) (Azerbaijan Railways annual report). Still only 4% of the northern rail corridor's 2024 volume, so the "boom” is relative.

3. Turkish and Gulf footprints: symbolic and material  
• Baykar's Kazakhstan factory is under construction outside Almaty; first Bayraktar TB-3 airframe delivery is scheduled for Q2/2026 (Baykar press-release, 02/2025). Until then, the strategic impact is reputational.  
• Gulf solar projects in Azerbaijan and Georgia total 1.8GW committed (ACWA Power disclosures), but none is operational yet; first electrons are expected late 2026.

4. Russia's remaining levers: declining, not disappeared  
• Migrant remittances: $12.7B flowed from Russia to Central Asia in 2024, down 9% in real terms (World Bank remittance database). The rouble's slide erodes value faster than out-migration numbers rise.  
• Rosatom: Kazakhstan's 2.4GW nuclear plant contract remains in force, yet 51% local equity and French-sourced turbines dilute Russian leverage; financial close is still pending (Samruk-Kazyna board minutes, 04/2025).  
• North-South transit via Iran: Russian Railways still controls slot allocation; 2024 throughput grew 12%, cushioning the loss of western corridors.

5. Scenarios, not certainties  
• If a Ukraine cease-fire released even 50K Russian troops, Russia could re-bid for peacekeeping roles in Karabakh and the Ferghana Valley. Monopoly losing is reversible under differing battlefield outcomes.

In short, Russia's suzerain model is under acute stress, yet every Central Asian or Caucasian capital still hedges rather than defects outright. The drift is directional, not definitive.